We present the eXtended Ciphertext Block Chaining XCBC schemes or modes of encryption that can detect encrypted-message forgeries with high probability even when used with typical noncryptographic Manipulation Detection Code MDC functions e.g., bitwise exclusive-or and cyclic redundancy code CRC functions. These modes detect encrypted-message forgeries at low cost in performance, power, and implementation, and preserve both message secrecy and integrity in a single pass over the message data. Their performance and security scale directly with those of the underlying block encryption function. We also present the XECB message authentication modes. These modes have all the operational properties of the XOR-MAC modes e.g., fully parallel and pipelined operation, incremental updates, and out-of-order veri cation, and have better performance. They are intended for use either stand-alone or with encryption modes that have similar properties e.g., counter-based XOR encryption. However, the XECB-MAC modes have higher upper bounds on the probability o f adversary's success in producing a forgery than the XOR-MAC modes.
Introduction
No one said this was an easy game ! Paul van Oorschot, March 1999.
A long-standing goal in the design of block encryption modes has been the ability to provide messageintegrity protection with simple Manipulation Detection Code MDC functions, such as the exclusive-or, cyclic redundancy code CRC, or even constant functions 9, 34, 12, 15 . Most attempts to achieve this goal in the face of chosen-plaintext attacks focused on di erent variations of the Cipher Block Chaining CBC mode of encryption, which is the most common block-encryption mode in use. To date, most attempts, including one of our own, failed 14 .
In this paper, we de ne the eXtended Ciphertext Block Chaining XCBC modes that can beused with an exclusive-or function to provide the authentication of encrypted messages in a single pass over the data. These modes detect integrity violations at a low cost in performance, power, and implementation, and can be executed in a parallel or pipelined manner. They provide authentication of encrypted messages in real-time, without the need for an additional processing path over the input data, and can be executed in a parallel or pipelined manner. The performance and security of these modes scales directly with the performance and security of the underlying block encryption function since separate cryptographic primitives, such a s hash functions, are unnecessary. We present some preliminary performance measurements of one of these modes via-a-vis CBC-MD5, CBC-HMAC-SHA1, and CBC-UMAC-STD30. We also present the XECB modes for message authentication i.e., XECB-MAC modes and their salient properties. These message authentication modes have all the operational properties of the XOR message authentication XOR-MAC modes e.g., they can operate in a fully parallel and pipelined manner, and support incremental updates and out-of-order veri cation 3 , and have better performance. That is, the XECB modes use only about half the number of block encryption required by the XOR-MAC modes. However, the XECB-MAC modes have higher bounds on the adversary's success of producing a forgery than those of the XOR-MAC modes. The XECB modes are intended for use either stand-alone to protect the integrity of plaintext messages, or with encryption modes that have similar properties e.g., counterbased XOR encryption whenever the it is desired that separate keys beused for secrecy and integrity modes.
An Integrity Mode for Encryption
Preliminaries and Notation. In de ning the encryption modes we adopt the approach of Bellare et al.
viz., 2, 3, 1 , who show that an encryption mode can be viewed as the triple E;D ;KG , where E is the encryption function, D is the decryption function, and K Gis the probabilistic key-generation algorithm. Similarly, a message authentication MAC mode can be viewed as the triple S; V; KG, where S is the message signing function, V is the message veri cation function, and K Gis the probabilistic key-generation algorithm. Our encryption and authentication modes are implemented with block ciphers, which are modeled with nite families of pseudorandom functions PRFs or pseudorandom permutations PRPs.
In this context, we use the concepts of pseudorandom functions, pseudorandom permutations PRPs and super-pseudorandom permutations SPRPs 2 , 21 . Let R l;L the set of all functions f0; 1g l f 0; 1g L .
We will use F to denote either a family of pseudorandom functions or a family of pseudorandom permutations, as appropriate e.g., for the encryption schemes, F will be a family of pseudorandom permutations, while for our MAC s c hemes, F can be a family of pseudorandom functions. A nite family of functions, F, consists of a set of functions and a set of strings i.e., the set of keys, each string identifying a member function, f. Each function f maps f0; 1g l to f0; 1g L , where l=L denotes the input output length, and hence we s a y that F has input output length l=L: The nite family F is pseudorandom if the input-output behavior of a function f = F K , which is identi ed by key K drawn uniformly at random from the set of keys, looks random" to someone who does not know K 2 . This means that someone's advantage in distinguishing F from R, which is the set of all functions that map f0; 1g l to f0; 1g L , usingueries of f in time t, is a negligible value, .
A natural way to model a block cipher is using a family of SPRPs. Let F : f0; 1g k f 0; 1g l ! f0; 1g l bea pseudorandom permutation family and f = F K bea permutation randomly chosen by key K i.e., K R f0; 1g k and f ,1 = F ,1 K its inverse. Let P l denote all the permutations on f0; 1g l , and A be a two-oracle adversary. F is a SPRP if the advantage of function F, Adv sprp F t; q; , is Adv sprp F t; q; = max A fAdv sprp F Ag ;
where the maximum is taken over all the adversaries A issuing q enciphering or deciphering queries totalling = qlbits and time t, is a negligible quantity, and where the advantage of an adversary A is Adv sprp F A = jP r A = 1 : f;f ,1 R F , P r A = 1 : f;f ,1 R P l j:
Given encryption scheme = E;D ;KG that is implemented with SPRP F, w e denote the use of the key K R K Gin the encryption of a plaintext string x by E F K x, and in the decryption of ciphertext string y by D F K y. The most common method used to detect modi cations of encrypted messages applies a MDC function g e.g., a non-keyed hash, cyclic redundancy code CRC, bitwise exclusive-or function 24 to a plaintext message and concatenates the result with the plaintext before encryption with E F K x. A message thus encrypted can bedecrypted and accepted as valid only after the integrity check is passed;
i.e., after decryption with D F K y, the concatenated value of function g is removed from the plaintext, and the check passes only if this value matches that obtained by applying the MDC function to the remaining plaintext 9, 34, 12, 24 . If the integrity check is not passed, a special failure indicator, denoted by N u l l herein, is returned. This method 1 has been used in commercial systems such as Kerberos V5 28, 30 and DCE 10, 30 , among others. The encryption scheme obtained by using this method is denoted by -g = E-g,D-g,KG, where is said to becomposed with MDC function g. In this mode, we denote the use of the key K in the encryption of a plaintext string x by E F K -gx, and in the decryption of ciphertext string y by D F K -gy.
A design goal for -g = E-g, D-g, KG modes is to nd the simplest encryption mode = E,D,KG e.g., comparable to the CBC modes such that, when this mode is composed with a simple, non-cryptographic MDC function g e.g., as simple as a bitwise exclusive-or function, message encryption is protected against existential forgeries. For any k ey K, a forgery is any ciphertext message that is not the output of E F K -g. An existential forgery EF is a forgery that passes the integrity c heck o f D F K -g upon decryption; i.e., for forgery y 0 , D F K -gy' 6 = N u l l , where N u l l is a failure indicator. Note that the plaintext outcome of an existential forgery need not be known to the forgerer. It is su cient that the receiver of a forged ciphertext decrypt the forgery correctly. Forgeries can be created in many w ays, for example 1 by modifying the ciphertexts of legitimate messages whose plaintext may be known by the forgerer, 2 by including arbitrary, never-seen-before, strings into existing ciphertexts, or 3 by combinations of the two. Ciphertexts of legitimate message encryptions can be obtained as a result of di erent attack scenarios, such a s c hosen-plaintext attacks CPA or ciphertextonly attacks CoA. Hence, message integrity attacks can be de ned as a combination of attack goals e.g., EF and attack scenarios e.g., CPA, as suggested by Naor 25 . Message Integrity A ttack: the EF-CPA Combination. The attack is de ned by a protocol between an adversary A and an oracle O as follows.
1. A and O select encryption mode -g = E-g,D-g,KG, and O selects, uniformly at random, a key K of K G . Adversary A is successful if at least one D F K -gy 0i 6 = N u l l for 1 i q v ; i.e., y 0i is an existential forgery.
The mode -g = E-g,D-g,KG is said to be secure against a message-integrity attack if the probability o f an existential forgery in a chosen-plaintext attack is negligible. We use the notion of negligible probability in the same sense as that of Naor and Reingold 25 .
Attack Parameters. A is allowed q e encryption queries i.e., queries to E F K -g, and q v decryption queries i.e., queries to D F K -g totaling e + v bits, and taking time t e + t v .
Parameters q e ; e ; t e are bound by the parameters de ning the chosen-plaintext security of = E,D,KG in a left-or-right sense 1 , for instance, and a constant c 0 de ning the speed of the function g. Brie y, the notion of security in the left-or-right sense allows adversary A to query the encryption function of oracle Q with q 0 queries of the form x l ; x r , where x l and x r are equal-length plaintext messages. O ips a coin and decides to encrypt the left or right messages of the q e queries depending on the outcome of the coin ip. The scheme is considered to be secure if, after receiving the q 0 encryption queries totaling 0 bits, and taking time t 0 , adversary A cannot obtain a non-negligible advantage i.e., greater than 0 in distinguishing which side of the queries was chosen for encryption by the oracle. Note that this notion of security implies the more intuitive one whereby an adversary is allowed q 0 chosen-plaintext queries, is given the encryption of a secret plaintext, and is supposed to nd that plaintext. In proving the security of scheme in a left-or-right sense, parameters q 0 ; 0 ; t 0 ; 0 are expressed in terms of the given parameters t; q; of the SPRP family F. Parameters q e ; e ; t e ; q v ; v ; t v are also bound by the parameters t; q; of the super-pseudorandom permutation F, namely e + v ql, and t e + t v t. The parameters q e ; q v are determined by e ; v . These parameters can be set to speci c values determined by the desired probability of adversary's success. Note that q v 0 since A must beallowed veri cation queries. Otherwise, A cannot test whether his forgeries are correct, since A does not know k ey K.
The message-integrity attack de ned above is not weaker than an adaptive one in the sense that the success probability of adversary A bounds from above the success probability of another adversary A 0 that intersperses the q e encryption and q v veri cation queries; i.e., the adversary is allowed to make his choice of forgery after seeing the result of legitimate encryptions and other forgeries. This has been shown for chosen-message attacks against MAC functions 3 , but the same argument holds here. To date, this is the strongest of the known goal-attack combinations against the integrity authentication of encrypted messages 4, 16, 17 . 3 De nition of the XCBC and XCBC-XOR Modes
In the encryption modes presented below, the key generation algorithm, K G , outputs a random, uniformly distributed, k-bit string or key K for the underlying SPR Pfamily F, thereby specifying f = F K and f ,1 = F ,1 K of l-bits to l-bits. If a separate second key is needed in a mode, then a new string or key K 0 is generated by K Gidentifying f 0 = F K 0 and f 0,1 = F ,1 K 0 . The plaintext message to beencrypted is partitioned into a sequence of l-bit blocks padding is done rst, if necessary, x = x 1 x n . Throughout this paper, is the exclusive-or operator and + represents modulo 2 l addition. The encryption modes de ned above use the same block chaining sequence as that used for the traditional CBC mode, namely z i = fx i z i,1 , where z 0 is the initialization vector, x i is the plaintext and z i is the ciphertext of block i; i = 1 ; ; n . In contrast with the traditional CBC mode, the value of z i is not revealed outside the encryption modes, and, for this reason, z i is called a hidden ciphertext block. The actual ciphertext output, y i , of the XCBC mode is de ned using extra randomization, namely y i = z i +ir 0 , where i r 0 is the modulo 2 l addition of the random, uniformly distributed, variable r 0 , i times to itself;
Stateless
i.e., ir 0 def = r 0 + + r 0 | z i times . In systems where the modular multiplication with a constant is fast, ir 0 can beimplemented as a per-block m ultiplication. It should be noted that other functions, or combinations of functions, not just the incremental addition modulo 2 l of r 0 , could be used to de ne the ciphertext block sequence y i ; e.g., subtraction modulo 2 l viz., also Support for Multiple Encryption Modes in the next section. Note that these functions may allow the low-order bits of some z i 's to become known.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the ciphertext blocks of other block-chaining sequences, such as Campbell's in nite garble extension mode," 9 can bemodi ed by y i = z i + i r 0 , not just the CBC ciphertext blocks.
In stateless implementations of the XCBC modes, r 0 f0; 1g l ; i.e., r 0 is initialized to a random, uniformly distributed, l-bit value for every message. The value of r 0 is sent by the sender to the receiver as y 0 = fr 0 . In contrast, in stateful implementations, a counter, ctr, is initialized to a new l-bit constant e.g., -1 for every key, K, and incremented on every message encryption. In both stateless and stateful implementations, the initialization vector z 0 is set to f 0 r 0 , which is independent of r 0 and, just as r 0 , remains secret. Alternate stateful implementations are possible whereby the counter ctr and the secret r 0 are shared by both the sender and receiver. As a consequence, the sender need not compute y 0 and send its value to the receiver. We also note that other functions, not just f 0 = F K 0, can be used for generating the secret initialization vector z 0 . For instance, z 0 = fr 0 + 1, in which case only a single key, K, is used. It is important that the encryption of these functions of r 0 produce a pseudorandom value for z 0 that is independent o f r 0 , and remains secret.
XCBC-XOR Modes. To illustrate the properties of the XCBC modes in integrity attacks, we choose gx = z 0 x 1 x n for plaintext x = x 1 x n , where z 0 is internally de ned by both the XCBC$ and XCBC modes. In this example, block gx is appended to the end of a n-block message plaintext x, and hence block x n+1 = z 0 x 1 x n . For this choice of gx, the integrity c heck performed at decryption becomes z 0 x 1 x n = f ,1 z n+1 z n , where z n+1 = y n+1 , n + 1 r 0 ; and z n = y n , n r 0 .
An adversary is successful if the forged ciphertext produced in the attack de ned above passes this check for at least one of the q v veri cation queries. Hence, an upper bound for the probability of adversary's success represents a quantitative measure of the integrity properties of the XCBC modes with respect to the choice of function gx = z 0 x 1 x n .
Throughout this paper, the stateless and stateful encryption modes -g obtained by the use of schemes = XCBC$ or = XCBC with function gx = z 0 x 1 x n are denoted by XCBC$-X O Rand XCBC-X O R , respectively.
Examples of Other Encryption Modes that Preserve Message Integrity. Few modes of encryption -g, where g is a simple, non-cryptographic MDC function, are known that are EF-CPA secure. The performance characteristics of most of these modes do not satisfy all our goals, however. For example, when implemented with the CBC mode and used to encrypt messages consisting of an integer numberof l-bit blocks possibly after padding, the Variable Input Length VIL cipher of Bellare and Rogaway 5 , 6 can be shown to be EF-CPA secure when using simple non-cryptographic MDC functions g, 2 such as those for the bitwise exclusive-or, CRCs, addition modulo 2 l , 1, the selection of a single constant-lled block or just block x 1 of every message, whose output is appended to the end of the message before encryption.
However, the VIL cipher uses two sequential passes over its input and, thus, its performance is lower than those of single-pass schemes using hash functions or separate-key MACs. Katz and Yung 16 proposed an interesting single-pass encryption mode, called the Related Plaintext
Chaining RPC, that is EF-CPA secure when using a non-cryptographic MDC function g consisting only of message start and end tokens. RPC has several important operational advantages, such as full parallelization, incremental updates, out-of-order processing, and low upper bound on the probability o f adversary's success in producing a forgery. 3 However, it wastes a substantial amount of throughput since it encrypts the block sequence number and message data in the same block. This may make the selection of modern hash functions as the MDC function g for common encryption modes, such as CBC, a superior performance alternative, at least for sequential implementations. Similarly the use of modern MACs, such as the UMAC, with a separate key may also produce better overall throughput performance than RPC when used with common encryption modes.
More recently, C.S. Jutla 20 proposed an interesting scheme in which the output blocks z i of CBC encryption are modi ed by i.e., bitwise exclusive-or operations with a sequence S i of pairwise independent elements. The complexity of this mode is superior to that of both VIL and RPC; i.e., this mode exceeds the complexity of single-pass schemes only by log n block encryptions, where n is the number of plaintext blocks of a message. This is shown to be a lower bound for a model where the only operations allowed in addition to block encryptions are linear operations over GF 2 l i.e., bitwise exclusive-or operations on l-bit blocks. Jutla also proposes a slightly di erent model that, just as the XCBC modes, also allows modular additions. In this model, S i = i r 0 + r 1 mod p, where r 0 ; r 1 are random values and p is prime, and the complexity n+ 3 . In contrast with Jutla's scheme, the elements of the XCBC sequence, S i = ir 0 mod 2 l , are not pairwise independent, and the complexity i s n + 2 . Also, the performance of the required modular 2 l additions is somewhat better than that of mod p additions, where p is prime. However, the pairwise independence of Jutla's S i sequence should yield a somewhat tighter bound on the probability of successful forgery i.e., tighter by a fraction of a log 2 factor depending on the value of p, illustrating, yet again, a fundamental tradeo between performance and security.
Properties of the XCBC Modes
The XCBC modes have notable secrecy and integrity properties in several areas. 1 . Support for Message Integrity. The XCBC modes require only a single cryptographic primitive, namely the block cipher that is necessary for encryption, to maintain integrity. Further, other functions i.e., not just the gx function de ned above, such as the CRCs and modular addition checksums, can also be used with the XCBC modes for protection against message integrity attacks unlike the original CBC and PCBC modes. Both the stateless and stateful XCBC modes can beused with gx = z 0 x 1 x n for real-time message sources in which 1 the message length remains unknown until the message ends, 2 the beginning of message authentication cannot bedeferred until the end of message receipt, and 3 only small, x-sized, bu ers for authentication processing are available, as would be the case with most low-cost, low-power, hardware implementations. Also the XCBC modes can produce good Message Authentication Codes MACs. For example, a Double MAC approach 26 can beused for both the XCBC$ XCBC modes to obtain good MACs. 3 . Support for Multiple Encryption Modes. The de nition of the ciphertext generation y i from the hidden ciphertext block z i , i.e., the output of the internal CBC encryption mode, can be changed to obtain other modes of encryption that may be faster or have better security bounds. For example, y i = z i i r 0 in which one of the additions mod 2 l per block is replaced by an exclusive-or; y i = z i + r i , where r i = a i r 0 is a linear congruence sequence with multiplier a. The multiplier a can bechosen so that the sequence passes spectral tests to whatever degree of accuracy is deemed necessary. Examples of goodmultipliers are readily available in the literature 18 . This mode may have a better upper bound for the probability of breaking the integrity condition.
We also note that the traditional PCBC modes can also be used to generate an XPCBC mode in the same way as the XCBC mode was generated based on the traditional CBC mode above. The conventional initialization-vector attacks de ned by Voydock and Kent 33 are also countered by the use of z 0 as the initialization vector. The XCBC modes capture the history of the message encryption only from the previous block, just as the CBC modes. However, in contrast to the original CBC modes, the XCBC modes add an extra randomization step which is the key ingredient that assures that the integrity c heck can pass only with low probability. Each segment is encrypted decrypted in parallel on a separate processor. In interleaved-parallel or pipelined implementations of the XCBC modes, the initialization and computation of the block chaining sequence is performed on a per-segment basis starting with a common value of r 0 , which is a random, uniformly distributed, l-bit value for every message. Also, the per-message value The encrypted segments of a message are assembled to form the message ciphertext. Segment assembly encodes the numberof segments L, the length of each segment n s and, implicitly, the segment sequence in the message e.g., all can be found in the ASN.1 encoding. If the segments of a message have di erent lengths, segment assembly is also synchronized with the end of each segment encryption or decryption within a message.
At decryption, the parsing of the message ciphertext yields the message length, L, segment sequence number, s, and the length of each segment, n s . Message integrity is maintained both on a persegment 7. Incremental Updates of Encrypted Data. The segmentation of a message used for parallel and pipelined implementation of the XCBC modes can also be used in sequential encryption of data structures e.g., a le, a message whenever incremental updates of data structures are anticipated. Such segmentation enables the localization of the decryption, plaintext update, and encryption to single segments saving the decryption and encryption of other segments una ected by the updates. Note that message integrity is retained after such incremental updates. 6 . Support for Architecture-Independent Parallel Encryption. In Jutla's recent scheme 20 , a parallel mode is proposed whereby both the input and output to the pseudo-random function are whitened" using a collection of pairwise independent random numbers. The fully parallel XCBC modes achieves the same e ect without pairwise independent random numbers. It is su cient to randomize the input of f using the same type of sequence as that used for the randomization of its output to obtain a low probability o f input or output collisions, which w ould be necessary to break integrity as illustrated in the next section, for the XECB MAC. More formally, for an arbitrary index i; 1 i n + 1 ; n = jxj, the ciphertext block y i is obtained through the formula: y i = fx i + i z 1 + i r 0 ; where z 1 is random, uniformly distributed and independent o f r 0 and z 0 . In this mode, there is no ciphertext chaining, and no a priori knowledge of the number of processors is necessary. The same function gx can be used here as in the sequential XCBC modes. 7 . Resistance to Key Attacks. Resistance to exhaustive key-guessing attacks can beimplemented in a similar manner as that of DESX 29 , if deemed necessary, in all of the above modes. However, adoption of modern block ciphers should reduce the need for this.
De nition of the XECB Authentication Modes
In this section, we introduce new Message Authentication Modes MACs that counter adaptive chosenmessage attacks 3 . We call these MACs the eXtended Electronic Code Book MACs, or XECB-MACs. The XECB-MAC modes have all the properties of the XOR MACs 3 plus they do not waste half of the block size for recording the block position. First we de ne these MACs, and then we present their properties. Several variants of such MACs can bederived, and here we present a stateless version of XECB-MAC, namely the XECB$-MAC, and a stateful version, namely the XECB-MAC.
A stateless implementation of the XECB$-MAC uses as initialization sequence r 0 f0; 1g l ; y 0 = fr 0 and z 0 = f 0 r 0 , where f 0 = F K 0 is a PRF selected with the second key K 0 . Clearly, the generation of z 0 can be performed with the same key, K , b y encrypting a function of r 0 . Use of K 0 is made here exclusively to simplify the proof. Then, each block of message x, namely x i ; 1 i n; n = jxj is randomized as x i +iy 0 , and the result is input to function f; i.e., y i = fx i +iy 0 : We also let x n+1 = z 0 and compute y n+1 = fz 0 + n + 1 y 0 . These values, y 1 ; ; y n ; y n+1 , and z 0 are exclusive-OR-ed to generate the authentication tag: w = y 1 y n y n+1 The algorithm outputs the pair r 0 ; w . For veri cation, the attacker submits a forgery x = x 1 x n and a forged pair r 0 ; w . 4 The algorithm proceeds with computing y 0 = fr 0 , then z 0 = f 0 r 0 , then computes y i = fx i + i y 0 ; 8i; 1 i n, y n+1 = fz 0 + n + 1 y 0 , and the authentication tag w 0 = y 1 y n y n+1 . The algorithm outputs a bit that is either 1, if the forged authentication tag is correct, namely w = w 0 , or 0, otherwise.
In the stateful mode, the signer maintains state across consecutive signing requests in the form of a counter ctr. Hence, the initialization phase is de ned as r 0 = fctr; z 0 = f 0 r 0 , where f 0 = F K 0 is a PRF selected with the second key K 0 . Then, for each message block, y i = fx i + i r 0 ; 8i; 1 i n; n = jxj, and y n+1 = fz 0 + n + 1 y 0 . The authentication tag is then de ned as w = y 1 y n y n+1 : The algorithm outputs the pair ctr; w . For veri cation, the attacker submits a forgery x = x 1 x n and a forged pair ctr; w . The algorithm proceeds with computing r 0 = fctr; z 0 = f 0 r 0 , then computes y i = fx i + i r 0 ; 8i; 1 i n, y n+1 = fz 0 + n + 1 y 0 , and the tag w 0 = y 1 y n y n+1 . The algorithm outputs a bit that is either 1, if the forged authentication tag is correct, namely w = w 0 , or 0, otherwise. The concrete implementation for the signing and verifying algorithms for the stateless and stateful XECB-MAC modes is de ned as follows. can be implemented using PRFs. It should be noted that the implementation of the XECB-MAC modes can be performed in software, hardware, or software with hardware support. Implementations can bein general-purpose computers or in dedicated hardware devices and software. We now present the properties of the stateless and stateful XECB-MAC modes.
6 Properties of the XECB Authentication Modes 1. Security. The XECB authentication modes are intended to be secure against adaptive c hosen-message q s ; q v -attacks 3 . These attacks are similar to the message integrity attack de ned in this paper. The only di erence is that instead of q e encryption queries totaling e bits and taking time t e , this attack uses q s signature queries, totaling s bits and taking time t s . Theorem 3 below shows the security bounds for these modes against adaptive c hosen-message attacks. The XECB modes have higher upper bounds on the adversary's success in producing a forgery than those of the XOR-MAC modes.
2. Parallel and Pipelined Operation. Function f e.g., DES, RC6 computations on di erent blocks can be made in a fully parallel or pipelined manner; i.e., it can exploit any degree of parallelism or pipelining available at the sender or receiver. This property is important for high speed networks and in both hardware and software implementations. 3 . Incremental Updates. The XECB-MAC modes are incremental with respect to block replacement, e.g., a block x i of a long message is replaced with a new value x 0 i . For instance, let us consider the stateless mode. Let the two messages have the same random block r 0 ; hence, the authentication tag of the new message, w 0 , is obtained from the authentication tag of the previous message, w, b y the following formula: w 0 = w fx i + i r 0 fx 0 i + i r 0 . The replacement property can be easily extended to insertion and deletion of blocks. 4 . Out-of-order Veri cation. The veri cation of the authentication tag can proceed even if the blocks of the message arrive out of order as long as each block is accompanied by its index and the rst block has been retrieved. 5 . Block Encryption Computations. In contrast to the XOR-MAC modes, where the number of block encryption computations is twice the number of block encryption computations for CBC-MAC 3 , the number of block encryption computations in the XECB-MAC modes is the same as the number of block encryption computations for the CBC-MAC. While in sequential implementations the performance of XECB-MACs is expected to bejust slightly lower than the performance of the CBC-MAC because of the two modular additions perblock vs. one exclusive-OR for CBC-MAC, the XECB mode can take advantage of parallelism or pipelining in an architecture-independent manner; i.e., the numberof processors available need not be known apriori a signi cant feature available only in few modes such as the XOR-MAC. This property, the out-of-order and incremental computation are especially important in hardware implementations, particularly in high-speed networks and for the internet. For this reason, the use of the XECB-MAC modes appears to bemore appropriate than that of the XOR-MAC for the integrity protection of messages encrypted under fully parallel or pipelined encryption schemes such as the XORrC 13 , which i s a random-counter variant of the counter-based XOR encryption mode 1 .
Security Considerations
In this section, we provide evidence for the security of the XCBC modes against both adaptive chosenplaintext and message-integrity attacks. We also present the security of the XECB modes in adaptive chosen-message attacks. We rst address the security i.e., secrecy of the XCBC$ mode against adaptive c hosen-plaintext attacks. The theorems and proofs that demonstrate that the stateful mode XCBC and the two-key variations are secure in a left-or-right sense 1 are similar to that for the XCBC$ mode and, therefore, will be omitted. The Lemma and Theorem below, which establish the security i.e., secrecy of the XCBC$ mode are restatements of Lemma 16 and Theorem 17 respectively, which are presented for the CBC mode in the full The following theorem de nes the security of the XCBC$ mode against an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack when the XCBC$ mode is implemented with a q; t; -pseudorandom function family F. F is q; t; -pseudorandom, or q; t; -secure, if an adversary 1 spends time t to evaluate f = F K at q input points via adaptively chosen queries, and 2 has a negligible advantage bounded by over simple guessing in distinguishing the output of f from that of a function chosen at random from R. In establishing the security o f the XCBC$ mode against the message-integrity attack, let the parameters used in the attack be bound as follows: q e q 0 , since the XCBC$ scheme is also chosen-plaintext secure, t e + t v t, and 00 = e + v ql. Let the forgery veri cation parameters q v ; v ; t v bechosen within the constraints of these bounds and to obtain the desired P r f R F Succ .
u t Theorem 2 Security of XCBC$-X O Ragainst a Message-Integrity Attack
Suppose F is a t; q; -secure SPRP family with block length l. The mode XCBC$-X O Ris secure against a message-integrity attack consisting of q e + q v queries, totaling e + v ql bits, and taking at most t e + t v t time; i.e., the probability of adversary's success is The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix A. Note that parameters q e ; e ; t e can be easily stated in terms of parameters t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 ; 0 of Theorem 1 above b y i n troducing a constant c 0 de ning the speed of the X O Rfunction.
Theorem 2 above allows us to estimate the complexity of a message-integrity attack. In a successful attack, P r f R F Succ 2 negligible; 1 . To estimate complexity, we set the probability o f success when f R P l to the customary 1=2, and assume that the attack parameters used in the above bound, namely e l ; v l , are of the same order or magnitude, namely 2 l , where 0 1. Also, since the shortest message has at least three blocks, q e ; q v b 2 l 3 c. The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 2 and is presented in Appendix B. A similar theorem can beprovided for the stateless message authentication mode. The complexity of an attack against the XECB MAC can be derived in a similar manner to that of the attack against the XCBC$-XOR mode.
Performance Considerations for the XCBC Modes
The performance of the XCBC modes in software implementations is 1 minimally degraded in comparison to that of the original CBC mode 11, 1 , and 2 superior to that of the original CBC modes, and most other similar modes, when message integrity is desired.
The XCBC$ modes add the overhead of two block encryption per message i.e., for generating z 0 and y 0 , and two mod 2 l additions per message block to the traditional CBC mode with random initialization vectors or, equivalently, with initialization vectors set to zero and a random number in the rst plaintext block 28 5 . However, the execution of both modulo 2 l additions for the current ciphertext block can always be overlapped with the block encryption of the next block and, hence, at peak speeds there is little perceptible overhead over that of the traditional CBC mode. This compares favorably with the overhead added at peak speeds by an original CBC mode that uses any of the hash functions known to date to provide message integrity. In any case, the dominant performance factor is the throughput achieved by block encryption. An important advantage of the new modes is that their performance scales up nearly identically with that of block encryption; furthermore, hardware implementations of the new modes can make the added overhead imperceptible.
To illustrate the performance characteristics of the XCBC$ scheme in software, we used the SSLeay library 31 , and conducted some preliminary measurements on a Sun SPARC Ultra 10 IIi processor running the SunOS 5.6 operating system. The processor has a 333 MHz clock, 2 MB of external o -chip cache, and 16 16 KB of internal on-chip instruction data cache. We used the version 4.2 of the native C compiler with the -xO2 optimization option. We used a lightly loaded machine for our measurements, and the throughput for each of the eight message sizes was generated by a veraging the results of fty runs.
Our implementation of the addition mod 2 l operations was also in uenced by the SSLeay implementation of the CBC scheme on 32-bit processors. However, we were able to use 64-bit additions for the XCBC$ operations. The hidden ciphertext blocks z i that result from the DES encryption which operates on two 32-bit unsigned longs are packed into the unsigned long long z i for the subsequent modular 64-bit additions. Each packing operation, which w ould be avoided in a 64-bit implementation, requires a bitwise or and a shift. The throughput of the CBC, XCBC$, CBC-MD5, CBC-UMAC-STD30, CBC-HMAC-SHA1, and XCBC$-XOR modes implemented with DES is shown in Figure 1 for samples of both large and small messages. 6 The percentage gain in the throughput performance of the XCBC$-XOR mode over that of the CBC-MD5, CBC-UMAC-STD30, and CBC-HMAC-SHA1 modes for these message samples is shown in Figure 2 . The results shown in these gures indicate that, in unoptimized software implementations, a substantial overall throughput improvement can be expected. For small messages i.e., between 1 Byte and 1 KB length, we can expect about 15 ,65 improvement for XCBC-XOR vs. CBC-MD5, about 78 , 113 for XCBC-XOR vs. CBC-UMAC-STD30, and about 44 , 99 for XCBC-XOR vs.
CBC-HMAC-SHA1. For large messages i.e., between 10 KB and 1MB length, we can expect about 15 , 20 improvement for XCBC-XOR vs. CBC-MD5, about 15 , 25 for XCBC-XOR vs. CBC-UMAC-STD30, and about 23 , 29 for XCBC-XOR vs. CBC-HMAC-SHA1. In general, we expect higher performance improvement for small messages than for large ones because, for small messages, the performance of the MD5 hash function and that of most hash functions, of UMAC-STD30 and HMAC-SHA1 is closer to that of DES than for large messages. Hence, our use of the function gx = z 0 x 1 x n improves a much larger fraction of the overall throughput of encrypted messages. throughput measurements for small-size messages shown in Figure 1 are susceptible to a signi cant margin of error caused by the inability to o set operating system e ects over a fairly short runtime for each test for such messages. For example, for 1 KB messages, the throughput of XCBC$ appears to be higher than that of CBC by about 8. Nevertheless, the performance illustrated in Figure 1 appears to beconsistent with individual MD5 and UMAC-STD30 measurements. For example, measurements reported for UMAC-STD30 8 show that it reaches peak speeds for messages between 80 KB and 128 KB, whereas Figure 1 indicates that the UMAC-STD30 reaches close-to-peak performance at 100 KB. Also, Figure 1 shows that, for 10 KB messages, UMAC-STD30 is within 22.2 of the speed measured at 100 KB, which appears to be consistent with the measurements reported for UMAC-STD30. the clear performance bottleneck is that of the DES-CBC and underlying DES block encryption. Figure 1 shows that the performance di erences between the DES-CBC, DES-XCBC$, and DES-XCBC$-XOR are almost imperceptible for mid-size and large messages. Given the advantage of using the function gx = z 0 x 1 x n over that of using gx = MD5 or any other hash function or MAC i n X CBC encryption, we expect that the gain in the performance of the XCBC$-XOR over that of CBC-MD5 or any other CBC-hash-function mode, CBC-UMAC-STD30, or CBC-HMAC-SHA1 to be even more pronounced for fast block encryption functions where the UMAC and MD5 or any other hash function would represent a higher fraction of the CBC-HMAC-SHA1, CBC-UMAC-STD30, and CBC-MD5 or CBC-any-hash-function cost.
We also expect that further improvements can be derived from an assembly language implementation where optimal register allocation can be performed for both the block encryption functions and the XCBC modes. It should be noted that the implementation of the XCBC modes can be performed in software, hardware, or software with hardware support. Implementations can be in general-purpose computers or in dedicated hardware devices and software. The simplicity of the XCBC modes suggests that substantial cost-performance improvement can beexpected when they are implemented in hardware. For example, DES hardware implementation reached 1.6 Gbp whereas HMAC-SHA-1 hardware implementation has reached only about half that speed. This seems to con rm early predictions that the speed of hash functions and MACs based on them does not scale in hardware implementations as well as that of block encryption functions 32, 7 . Thus, we can expect performance speedups of about 100,200 over current hardware implementation modes for message encryption and authentication. Of particular interest in this area are implementations of the XCBC modes on low-power and or low-cost devices.
Appendix A -Proof Security of the XCBC$-X O Rin a Message-Integrity Attack Notation: Throughout this proof, the superscripts of variables x p ; z p ; y p , and r p 0 denote the plaintext, hidden ciphertext, ciphertext, and initial random value of a queried message p; 1 p q e , whereas the primed variables x 0i , z 0i , y 0i , and r 0i 0 denote the plaintext, hidden ciphertext, ciphertext, and the initial random value of the i-th forged i.e., unqueried message, 1 i q v . The length of the plaintext of message p is denoted by n p = jx p j and that of forgery y 0i by n 0i = jx 0i j blocks. These lengths do not include the last plaintext block that holds the value of the XOR function.
To nd an upper bound on the probability of an adversary's success we 1 de ne four types of events on which we condition the adversary's success, 2 express the upper bound in terms of the conditional probabilities obtained, and 3 compute upper bounds on these probabilities. Our choice and numberof conditioning events is motivated exclusively by the need to obtain a good upper bound for the probability of the adversary's success. Undoubtedly, other events could be used for deriving alternate upper bounds. To provide some intuition for the choice of conditioning events de ned, we give examples of events that cause an adversary's success. The reader can skip these examples without loss of continuity.
Examples of Adversary's Success. A way for the adversary to nd a forgery y 0 that passes the integrity check gx 0 = x 0 n+1 , is to look for collisions in the input of f ,1 , namely collisions of the 1 hidden ciphertext blocks generated during the decryption of a forgery, z 0 s ; 1 Suppose that all hidden ciphertext blocks z 0 s obtained during the decryption of forgery y 0 collide with some hidden ciphertext blocks z p k obtained at encryption. If this event occurs during forgery decryption, we declare pessimistically that the adversary is successful. Why is the adversary successful? Among the forgeries that make this event true, some will decrypt correctly with probability one. For example, if any two of the hidden ciphertext blocks between position 1 and n p of a queried message p are swapped, the decryption of the resulting hidden ciphertext will pass the integrity check gx 0 = x 0 n+1 with probability one viz., 24 , Example 9.89, pp. 367-368, for a similar example. Thus, any forgery that generates such hidden ciphertext at decryption will pass this integrity c heck with probability one. Why is our criterion for adversary's success based on such a collision event pessimistic? Among the forgeries that make this event true, some will decrypt correctly with negligible probability. These forgeries include truncations of the ciphertext of already queried messages. 7 For truncations, the integrity check cannot pass with probability greater than 1=2 l and for this reason we can focus on other types of forgeries for the rest of this proof. Suppose that two hidden ciphertext blocks z 0 s and z 0 t obtained during forgery decryption do not collide with any hidden ciphertext blocks obtained during encryption, but collide with each other. If this event occurs during forgery decryption, we declare pessimistically that the adversary is successful. Why is the adversary successful? Among the forgeries that make e v ent true, some will decrypt correctly with probability one. For example, if any t wo identical blocks never seen among the hidden ciphertext blocks obtained at encryption are inserted into two adjacent positions between 1 and n p of the hidden ciphertext of message p i.e., z 0 s = z 0 s+1 ; 1 s n p , 1, the decryption of the resulting hidden ciphertext will pass the integrity c heck gx 0 = x 0 n+1 with probability one viz., 24 , Example 9.89, pp. 367-368, for a similar example. Thus, any forgery that generates such hidden ciphertext blocks at decryption will pass this integrity c heck with probability one. Why is our criterion for adversary's success based such a collision event pessimistic? Among the forgeries that make this event true, some will decrypt correctly with negligible probability. For example, consider forgeries that cause an odd number of identical hidden ciphertext blocks to be generated during decryption. Suppose these blocks have the following properties: 1 they do not collide with any hidden blocks obtained at encryption, 2 they do not collide with any initialization blocks y i 0 ; 1 i q e , obtained at encryption, The fourth type of collision event, denoted by E below, de nes collisions among the initialization blocks i.e., block 0 of the ciphertext generated at encryption. Hence, this collision event is independent of the forgery y 0i . Formally, this event is de ned as E : y i 0 = y p 0 ;
where i 6 = p; 1 i; p q e .
Note 1: Other events than the four de ned above could cause an adversary's forgery y 0i to pass the integrity check gx 0i = x 0i n i +1 . However, Claim 1 below makes it clear that the success of such a forgery could only occur with probability no greater than 1=2 l . Upper bound on the Probability of Successful Forgery. Let F bea SPRP family, P l be the set of all permutations on f0; 1g l , and f R P l denote the random selection of f and f ,1 from P l . Let S f R P l represent all the ciphertext blocks produced at the encryption of the q e queries viz., the de nition of S used for collision events above when the XCBC$-XOR scheme is implemented with f R P l ; i.e., S where R l;l is the set of all functions from f0; 1g l to f0; 1g l . We denote by f R G S the random selection of f and f from G S . The family of functions G S behaves exactly like P l when the plaintext blocks input to f and ciphertext blocks input to f ,1 are those generated during the encryption of any adversary's q e chosen-plaintext queries, and behaves exactly like R l;l during the decryption of any ciphertext block not in S f R P l .
Note that the family G S is well-de ned for any message-integrity attack because, by de nition of such a n attack viz., Section 2, all q e encryption queries preceed all q v forgery veri cation queries. Thus S f R P l and f are completely determined before any o f t h e q v forgery veri cation queries are possible, whose processing would require block decryption with f. Also note that we allow q e = 0 and, in this case, S f R P l = ; and f = v.
For the balance of this proof, we use the result of Fact 1 below whose proof can be found at the end of this appendix that provides the reduction from f R F to f R G S . To compute an upper bound for the probability o f successful forgery, P r Succ , we condition on event E rst, since this event does not depend on the forgery y 0i . Using standard conditioning, we obtain P r Succ P r E + P r Succ j E :
Since event E is equivalent to the event that at least a collision happens when q e balls are thrown at random in 2 l buckets 3 , P r E q e q e , 1 2 l+1 :
To nd an upper bound for P r Succ j E , we use the de nition of adversary's success viz., the attack de nition, which states that at least one forgery and veri cation query y 0i succeeds; i.e., there exists an index i; 1 i q v such that gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 . Hence, by union bound, P r Succ j E qv X i=1 P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 j E :
To nd an upper bound for the probability o f decrypting a single, arbitrary non-truncation forgery y 0i
correctly given E, namely for P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 j E , we condition on event C i or D i . Using the total probability formula we obtain: P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 j E = P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 j E and C i or D i P r C i or D i j E + P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0i +1 j E and C i and D i P r C i and D i j E :
Hence, 9 P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 j E P r C i or D i j E + P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0i +1 j E and C i and D i :
However, both event C i and event D i depend on the event I i viz., Example 3 above. Hence, to compute P r C i or D i j E w e condition on event I i and, using the total probability formula, we obtain: P r C i or D i j E = P r C i or D i j E and I i P r I i j E + P r C i or D i j E and I i P r I i j E P r I i j E + P r C i or D i j E and I i :
Furthermore, P r C i or D i j E and I i = P r C i or D i j C i and E and I i P r C i j E and I i +P r C i or D i j C i and E and I i P r C i j E and I i P r C i or D i j C i and E and I i + P r C i j E and I i = P r C i j E and I i + P r D i j C i and E and I i ; since event C i or D i j C i and E and I i is equivalent t o e v ent D i j C i and E and I i .
Combining the results of the last three inequalities, we obtain: P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 j E P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 j E and C i and D i + P r I i j E + P r C i jE and I i : + P r D i j C i and E and I i
The probabilities that appear at the right side of this inequality are bounded as shown in the following four claims whose proofs are included below. Note again that forgeries based on truncations of ciphertext messages obtained at encryption are not included in any of the claims below. All these claims refer to a single, arbitrary non-truncation forgery y 0i ; 1 i q v .
Claim 1 P r gx 0i = x 0i n 0 i +1 j E and C i and D i 1 Hence, to simplify notation in the proof of these claims, we drop the forgery index i from the events D i ; C i ; I i , and simply use D;C;I for these events. We also drop the forgery index i from the collection Z i and use Z instead. Furthermore, we drop the prime and forgery index i from the ciphertext y 0i , hidden ciphertext, z 0i , plaintext x 0i , r 0i 0 , and the length n 0 i . Hence, when we refer to the single forgery, we use the variables y, for forgery ciphertext, x for forgery plaintext, z for the hidden blocks of forgery y, y 0 for the initialization block of forgery y and r 0 for the decryption of the initialization block y 0 , and n for the length of x. Superscripts continue to identify encryption queries. In the proof of Claims 1 4, we use the notation P r A : = P r : jA , where A is an arbitrary event.
Proof of Claim 1 If C is true, then Z is not empty. For any z s 2 Z, x s = fz s z s,1
Since z s does not collide with any hidden blocks obtained at encryption, and event C and D is true i.e., there is at least one hidden block z s 2 Z by e v ent C that does not collide with another hidden ciphertext block z t 2 Z;s 6 = t or with y 0 by e v ent D, then fz s = vz s is uniformly distributed and independent o f anything else since v R R l;l ; i.e., independent o f a n y other fz k ; z k 2 Z, k 6 = s, and independent o f a n y z k ; 0 k n + 1 . Hence, the corresponding plaintext block x s is uniformly distributed and independent of anything else. Thus, gx x n+1 = z 0 x 1 x n x n+1 is random and uniformly distributed, and hence: P r gx x n+1 = 0 j E and C and D = P r gx = x n+1 j E and C and D 1 2 l : u t
In the proofs of Claims 2 4, we use the following three facts, whose proofs can befound at the end of this appendix. n + 1 2 l = n + 1 q e 2 l :
To compute an upper bound for the second term, namely on P r I and E z s 2 fz p k ; 1 p q e ; 1 k n p + 1 g , we are free to choose a hidden ciphertext block a t index j of forgery y, namely z j , and then we only need to show that P r I and E z j 2 fz p k ; 1 p q e ; 1 k n p + 1 g , is bounded. This is the case because the bound must be true for any s; 1 s n + 1.
Thus, the balance of the proof of Claim 3 consists of two parts. In the rst part, we partition the space of forgeries that are not truncations into three complementary types and choose a z j and hence, index j for each type. In the second part, we nd an upper bound for the probability P r I and E z j 2 f z p k ; 1 p q e ; 1 k n p + 1 g for each of the chosen z j 's. Hence, the maximum of these three upper bounds represents the upper bound for P r I and E z j 2 f z p k ; 1 p q e ; 1 k n p + 1 g for all forgeries that are not truncations. Let us choose index j and hence z j as follows. For forgeries of type a, j = n i + 2 or j n i + 1; for forgeries of type b1, j = 1; and for forgeries of type b2, j is the smallest index such that y j 6 = y i j ; 1 j minfn i + 1 ; n + 1 g. In all cases j 1, and hence, the chosen ciphertext block z j is well de ned. Now we nd an upper bound for P r I and E z j = z p k for each of the three forgery types. In determining this upper bound, we use the following claim, whose proof can be found at the end of this appendix: Let the ciphertext of queried message i bethe pre x of forgery y. To nd the upper bound in this case, we partition the sum P qe p=1 P np+1 k=1 P r I and E z j = z p k i n to two sums, for p 6 = i and p = i, respectively. For p 6 = i, w e use Claim 3.2a, and for p = i we use Claim 3.2b, to nd an upper bound for P r I and E z j = z p k . Then we nd individual upper bounds for each of these two sums, and add these upper bounds. For the second sum, we note that p = i, which means that y 0 = y i 0 = y p 0 , and that j = n i + 2 k ; 8k;1 k n i + 1 . Hence, by Claim 3.2b P r I and E z j = z p k Upper bound for forgeries of type b2.
Let the rst j , 1 ciphertext blocks of queried message i provide the rst j , 1 ciphertext blocks of forgery y. To nd the upper bound in this case, we partition the sum P qe p=1 P np+1 k=1 P r I and E z j = z p k into four terms, nd individual upper bounds for each term, and then add these upper bounds. The rst term is a sum taken for p 6 = i and in this case we use Claim 3.2a to nd an upper bound for P r I and E z j = z p k .
The last three terms are for the case p = i, and two of these terms are sums taken for k j and k j , respectively. For these sums, we apply Claim 3.2b to nd an upper bound for P r I and E z j = z p k . For the remaining term corresponding to i = p and k = j, w e show that the event z j = z p k is impossible. Now, we add the bounds of the last three of the individual upper bounds, and then we add the rst upper bound to obtain the total upper bound for forgeries of type b2. n i , j + 1 2 log 2 n i , j + 1 + 3 : Since for this type of forgeries 1 j n i + 1, the terms under log 2 are j , 1 n i ; n i , j + 1 n i . Thus, the sum of the last three terms is bounded as follows: j,1 X k=1 P r I and E z j = z i k + P r I and E z j = z i j + n i ,j+1 Finally, for any forgery that is not a truncation, P r I and E z j 2 fz p k ; 1 p q e ; 1 k n p + 1 g is bounded by the maximum of the bounds for the types a, b1 and b2, namely P r I and E z j 2 f z p k ; 1 p q e ; 1 k n p + 1 g 1 u t
Proof of Claim 4
Event C is true implies that there is at least one element z s 2 Z. Event D states that any hidden ciphertext block z s 2 Z collides with another hidden block z t 2 Z;t 6 = s, or z s collides with y 0 . Hence, D z s = z t ; for some s; t; 1 s; t n + 1 ; z s ; z t 2 Z;s 6 = t or z s = y 0 . This implies that P r D j C and E and I P r z s = z t ; z s ; z t 2 Z;t 6 = s or z s = y 0 j C and E and I
Union bound leads to: P r D j C and E and I P r z s = z t ; z s ; z t 2 Z;t 6 = s j C and E and I +P r z s = y 0 j C and E and I To compute the upper bound of the rst probability of the sum, P r z s = z t ; z s ; z t 2 Z;t 6 = s j C and E and I , recall that Z must have at least one element since C is true. If Z has only one element, then this probability is zero. If Z has at least two elements, z s ; z t , w e use the following claim, whose proof can be found at the end of this Appendix: To compute an upper bound for the second probability of the above sum, namely on P r z s = y 0 j C and E and I , we use Claim 4.1b and obtain: P r z s = y 0 j C and E and I 1
where m is de ned by s = d 2 m and d is odd. By de nition, m log 2 s log 2 n + 1, and hence 2 m n + 1 . Thus, P r z s = y 0 j C and E and I n + 1
By adding the two upper bounds, it follows that P r D j C and E and I n 2 l + n + 1
u t
Proof of Fact 1 a Let A be an adversary attacking the X C B C $,X O Rmode using q e +q v queries, e + v total memory for these queries, and time t e + t v . The probability of success is related directly to the security of the underlying encryption mode XCBC$ and F. To nd an upper bound for this probability, we introduce a distinguisher D for F, which is given two oracles f and f ,1 , where f is a permutation used by the The above probabilities are over the random choice of r 0 , f R F, f R P l , and D's guesses. Hence, P r f R F Succ = P r f R F Succ , P r f R P l Succ + P r f R P l Succ = Adv sprp D F;P l + P r f R P l Succ + P r f R P l Succ :
b This proof is based on constructing a polynomial-time algorithm D that distinguishes between f ,1 R P l and f R G S using an adversary A for the X C B C $ , X O Rmode.
In a similar manner to the one used in part a repeated here for completeness, let A bean adversary attacking the X C B C $ , X O Rmode using q e + q v queries, e + v total memory for these queries, and time t e + t v . To nd an upper bound for P r f R P l Succ , we introduce a distinguisher D for P l which is Now w e nd an upper bound for D's advantage in distinguishing between P l and G S , namely Adv D P l ; G S .
By the de nition of the two oracles O and O ,1 , only oracle O ,1 can be used by D to distinguish between P l and G S . Furthermore, whenever a block decryption request to oracle O ,1 is a ciphertext block that was generated during the encryption of A's q e queries, the output of oracle O ,1 is the same for both f R P l and f R G S by the de nition of f, and a distinction between P l and G S cannot bemade. D can make a distinction between P l and G S only when the ciphertext blocks of the decryption requests to oracle O ,1 i.e., the inputs to f ,1 or f have never been generated during the encryption of A's q e queries; i.e., the ciphertext blocks are not in S f R P l . 10 e, and dr 0m = b , edr 0m = eb , r 0m = eb mod 2 l,m , which happens with probability 1 =2 l,m because r 0m = r 1 l , m is random and uniformly distributed in f0; Since, by h ypothesis, we focus on the probability for adversary's success when f R R l;l , and, for simplicity, we will drop the f R R l;l subscript from the probability equations.
To nd an upper bound on the probability o f an adversary's success we use the same proof technique as for the XCBC$-X O Rscheme. That is, we 1 de ne several types of events on which we condition the adversary's success, 2 express the upper bound in terms of the conditional probabilities obtained, and 3 compute upper bounds on these probabilities. As before, our choice and number of conditioning events is motivated exclusively by the need to obtain a good upper bound for the probability of the adversary's success. Undoubtedly, other events could be used for deriving alternate upper bounds. We provide some intuition for the choice of conditioning events de ned, by giving the following examples of events that cause an adversary's success. The reader can skip these examples without loss of continuity.
Examples of Adversary's Success. A way for the adversary to nd a forgery x 0 that passes the integrity check w 0 = w, is to look for collisions in the input of f, at forgery veri cation. The following three examples illustrate why such collisions cause an adversary's success. Other such examples, and other ways to nd forgeries, exist.
Example 1 Collisions between inputs of f at forgery veri cation with those at message signing Suppose that all inputs to f at forgery veri cation collide with inputs to f at signing. We pessimistically declare the adversary to be successful. For example, suppose that two of the block inputs to f at the veri cation of forgery x 0 ; ctr 0 ; w 0 represent two swapped inputs to f at the signing of message x using counter ctr and obtaining the authentication tag w. Also suppose that all other inputs to f at forgery veri cation are the same as those of message x at signing. Hence, x 0 6 = x. In this case, the authentication check for forgery x 0 ; ctr 0 = ctr; w 0 = w will pass the integrity c heck.
It should benoted that this criterion for adversary's success is pessimistic because, among the forgeries that make this event true some will decrypt correctly with negligible probability. For instance, if a forgery x 0 is a truncation of a signed message, the collision of the last forgery block x 0 n 0 +1 = z 0 0 + n 0 + 1 r 0 0 with any of the inputs to f or f 0 at message signing is a negligible-probability e v ent and hence truncation would have a negligible chance of success viz., Claim 1 below provides some intuition for this statement. where I s is the set of all the counters used at signing, S is the set of all the inputs to function f aside from the counters at signing, and V i is the set of all the inputs to function f aside from the counters at veri cation of query i. Based on sets I s ; S ; V i , w e i n troduce the following collision events that arise at the veri cation of forgery x 0i ; ctr 0i ; w 0i :
Event C i includes all instances when inputs of f at forgery veri cation aside from counters collide with either counters or inputs to function f at message signing. aside from counters and last block do not collide with any other such inputs and with any of the counters used at message signing and forgery veri cation. Note that event R s is independent o f a n y forgery i.
Upper bound on the Probability of Successful Forgery. By standard conditioning, P r Succ P r Succ j R s + P r R s P r Succ j R s + P r P s + P r P v + P r Q s ;
since R s = P s or P v or Q s . The second, third and fourth terms in the sum are bounded as in the following Hence, we rst compute the probability of adversary's success when a single forgery veri cation is allowed;
i.e., we compute P r w 0i = y 0i Using these events, we show that the probability of adversary's success in creating a successful forgery i is Non-truncation Forgeries. Now, we nd an upper bound for P r w 0i = y 0i 1 y 0i n 0 i +1 j R s for nontruncation forgeries. To compute this upper bound, we de ne an event such that 1 the probability of successful forgery is 1=2 l when this event occurs, and 2 the probability o f the complement o f this event has a negligible upper bound. Using the events de ned above and by standard conditioning, we obtain: P r w 0i = y 0i 1 y 0i n 0 i +1 j R s P r w 0i = y 0i 1 2 l : The other probabilities that appear in the expression for the total probability P r w 0i = y 0i 1 In a manner similar to the one used in the proof of a, since ctr 0a are also constants, P r P v s l2 l : c Event Q s , deals with collisions between inputs to f at signing within the same message, namely x p j + j r p 0 6 = x p k + k r p 0 where 1 p q s ; 1 j; k n p ; j 6 = k. Since Q s 9 p; j; k; 1 p q s ; 1 j; k n p ; j 6 = k : x p j + j r p 0 6 = x p k + k r p we choose an index j such that for any type of possible non-truncation forgery i, the input to f at the veri cation of forgery i, namely x 0i j + j r 0i 0 , does collide with any input to f during message signing with low probability. Next, we compute an upper bound for these collisions. All non-truncation forgeries can bepartitioned in a similar manner as that used in the proof of Claim 3 of Theorem 2. That is, we de ne extensions of the plaintext of a signed message, which w e call the pre x case, and the complementary case, which w e call non-pre x case. The non-pre x case includes two separate subcases, namely when ctr 0i is di erent from any ctr p of any message p obtained at signing i.e., message x p ; ctr p ; w p , or when there is a signed message p such that ctr 0i = ctr p . Hence, in the latter subcase, there must be at least a block position j in the forged message x 0i that is di erent from the corresponding block of the signed message p. This partition of all possible forgery types shows that a forged message x 0i = x 0i 1 x 0i n 0 i which is not a truncation, can be in one of the following three complementary types: a 9p; 1 p q s : n 0 i n p ; ctr 0i = ctr p and 8k;1 k n p : x 0i k = x p k ; i.e., the forged message is an extension of message x p the pre x case. The non-pre x case consists of the following two forgery types: b1 ctr 0i 6 = ctr p ; 8p; 1 p q s ; and b2 9p; 1 p q s : ctr 0i = ctr p ; 9k;1 k minn 0 i ; n p : x 0i k 6 = x p k ; i.e., the forged message is obtained by modifying a queried message starting with some block b e t ween the second and last block. Now w e c hoose index j mentioned above for each t ype of possible non-truncation forgeries, as follows: for forgeries of type a, j = n p + 1 ; for forgeries of type b1, j = 1 ; and for forgeries of type b2, j is the smallest index such that x 0i j 6 = x p j ; 1 j minfn p ; n 0 i g. In all cases 1 j n 0 i , and hence, the chosen block x 0i j is well de ned. Event C i implies that x 0i j + j r 0i 0 2 I s or x 0i j + j r 0i 0 2 S. Hence, by union bound P r C i j R v i and R s P r x 0i j + j r 0i 0 2 I s j R v i and R s + P r x 0i j + j r 0i 0 2 S j R v i and R s :
Let us de ne the following events:
E I s : x 0i j + j r 0i 0 2 I s E S : x 0i j + j r 0i 0 2 S: u t
